565 other hand, because of the existence of extended
596 families and the clan structure, less fortunate
428 members of these groups might be helped by relatives to gain a living or an education. A substantial amount of land was usually allotted to the communal family or clan for religious, educational, or charity purposes by illustrious members of the family or clan. Nepotism was simply a projection of the family ideal of mutual help among the members. Clan nepotism often accounted for a man's rise on the social and economic ladder. This practice contributed to the upward movement of poorer segments of the population who otherwise might never have advanced socially and economically in a relatively short period of time.

183 The scholar ideal. Learning was much es-
565 teemed, especially when combined with wealth.
555 The prestige of the wealthy was never complete until their wealth was adorned with culture. Indicative of the respect all Chinese had for learning was the popular saying: "Although your children may be of low intelligence, you as parents should make them study the Classics."[6] The emphasis

6. This stress on learning and cultivation of the Chinese was studied by Max Weber. In his Religion of China, Weber goes so far as to conclude that this emphasis caused the lack of capital accumulation necessary for the development of modern capitalism in China. While this analysis may be oversimple, it indicates that the traditional supremacy of officialdom over the merchant groups may have impeded the rise of a system of negotiable property rights, protected
[ continued next page]

183 565 555 on learning was buttressed by the imperial examination system, the means by which official positions were obtained, which, in turn, during peace time was the quickest means to the acquisition of wealth and social prestige in China. The saying, "After I have studied I will take a government position," was indicative of the usual goal in education. Wealthy families as a matter of course and poorer families at great sacrifice educated one or more of their sons in the Classics in order to obtain immediate prestige in the eyes of the community and with the hope of the son's eventual success in the examinations, which might lead to an official position and enrichment of the family fortune. Thus, education contributed to the upward movement of the familes, be they of the landed, merchant, or bureaucrat groups. On the other hand, the allocation of family income to the support of one or more unproductive persons through years of study with no assurance of economic return often dissipated the fortune of the family and led to the loss of economic status. Moreover, the belief that those who used their brains were superior to those who used their brawn contributed to the scholars' contempt for manual skills and

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6. [continued] ...by corporation law instead of official favoritism, and capable of supplying the investment capital needed for industrialization. Teng and Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 274-75.

183 565 555 commercial activity. Therefore, if a scholar did not pass the examination, or having passed it, failed to obtain official appointment, and if the successive divisions of his family property reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he would find it difficult to improve his economic status. At the same time, his lack of economic means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in the social hierarchy.

The scholars, therefore, are not to be regarded as a separate class or a separate occupational group, except as they relied for their livelihood on the teaching profession or the use of their literary skills in a clerical capacity, but rather as "leisure" members of families of varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial groups. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government, and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents of no current import. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only a way to added prestige.

The road to status and wealth through education and government service was often by-passed

183 in time of chaos; then military skills would enable
565 individuals to obtain high positions in the bureau-
555 cracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had become cultivated, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity to acquire learning under tutelage of well-known scholars due to their parents' wealth.

C. Social Organizations

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Social organizations which had no basis in kinship were not recognized as approved parts of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominence. However, they helped to supplement relationships otherwise neglected by the social order. Most of the traditional non-kin social organizations had an economic motivation. The success of such organizations, however, served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system.

In the rural areas, organizations such as the Red Spear Society (Hung-ch'iang Hui) and the Mutual Protection Society (Lien-ya Hui) existed for the protection of its members against roving bandits. These voluntary associations arose in areas where the government failed to maintain order and peace, and their organization cut across class and occupational lines. When landlords were forced to move into towns during periods of disorder, organized peasants and tenants at times became so powerful that they defied the landlords' demand for exorbitant rents.

596 of the structure, function, and attitudes of the traditional family. Second, consideration must be given to the incidence and nature of change in the family preceding the Communist regime. Only then can intelligent consideration be given to the family under the Central People's Government. Finally, attention will be devoted to the unique factors that characterize the family in Southwest China.

## II. THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

594 596 565 183 The term "family" in China has been most usefully defined as "a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common property."[2] Three main types of family structure have been distinguished -- the conjugal, the stem, and the joint forms. The joint family, consisting of several married brothers, their wives, children, and sometimes one or both parents, was the ideal family of China. It was typical only of the gentry and well-to-do merchant classes. The conjugal family, consisting of a man, his wife, and unmarried children, and the stem family, consisting of the conjugal family plus one married son with his wife and children, were most typical of the peasant, artisan, and small merchant class. For all classes, however, the joint family was the ideal to be achieved if an improvement in family circumstances permitted.[3]

2. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1946, p. 13. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

3. Ibid., pp. 13-16. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 42-60.

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[redacted]

In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[32] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

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A. Good and Bad

In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that social harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways.

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32. For example, as late as 1941-43, one anthropologist found in rural Yunan that the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was still,

183 Bad conduct was not, as in the West, violation of the laws of God but deviation from the age-old norms of acceptable social behavior. Specifically, behavior was categorized as "bad" if it went against such prescribed norms as the following: (1) hsiao, filial submission to fathers and elders; (2) chung, loyal and submissive devotion to superiors; (3) hsin, good faith among friends and associates; (4) jen, benevolence or fellow-feeling which should inform all social relationships; (5) i, righteousness in one's dealings with others; (6) li [ good form], accepted procedures in human relations; (7) lien, integrity; and (8) ch'ih, sense of shame.

The laws of imperial China provided heavy punishments for violations of these norms; the most heinous crimes were those against hsiao, filial submission. Yet the ideal in the application of law was not blindfold justice but punishment administered with due regard for "human feelings [ jen-ch'ing] and for the specific circumstances surrounding the crime. This attitude is illustrated in the old proverb: "There is one thing worse than a dishonest official and that is an honest official," which

[ 32. continued] as it had been for centuries, "the foundation stone...of social organization, ...the measuring stick of all behavior and of the worth of the individual.

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expressed disapproval of a rigorous enforcement of rules and regulations, of an enforcement that fails to take into account "human feelings." [33] The criteria for judging behavior as good or bad were therefore neither religious nor legalistic, but were the prevailing norms in the community, the customary practices sanctioned by tradition and ratified by a high degree of community consensus.

In traditional Chinese goodness could be cultivated through practice, study, and contemplation. Confucianism held that the path to goodness was open to all, that those who attained a high order of goodness should be a moral elite, a group of exemplars for others. This moral elite was also, in Confucian theory, the group which should hold and exercise political power and enjoy the rewards of status and wealth. This nation sanctioned the long political dominance of the scholar-official.

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The Chinese Communists have laid out new standards of good and bad. In the words of their leading theoretician, their aim is "...to reform mankind into the completely selfless citizenry of a Communist society." [34] In setting the new standards the Communists have consciously and unconsciously selected concepts from traditional moral

33. Ruth Bunzel and John Weakland, "An Anthropological Approach to Chinese Communism," Columbia Univ. Research in Contemporary Cultures, New York, 1952, pp. 80-81. Hereafter cited as Bunzel-Weakland.

34. Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Training of the Communist Party Member," first presented as a speech in 1939; cf. trans. in Boyd Compton, Mao's China, Seattle, 1952, p. 146.

183 ideas; some have been discarded, others have been taken over with little adaptation; still others linger 168 between the lines and in the implications of Communist utterances.

The old virtues associated with the traditional family have been discarded because the old family system has been dissolved, its functions taken over by the modern conjugal family on the one hand and by state and Party organizations on the other.[35] Familial virtues are castigated as "feudal" and as backward features of what the leadership calls "the squalid old society of China."[36]

The basic Marxist dogma that the individual is molded by his class position and, indirectly, by the "stage" of the society into which he is born, has a good deal in common with the Confucian view of the prime importance of environment in the formation of character. Thus the Communist effort to create a new society, in both traditional Chinese and Marxist terms, will create a favorable environment for the development of individual goodness. But the "goodness" expected is different: "To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the Party, for the sake of the class, for national liberation, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one's own life without the slightest hesitation, with a feeling

35. J.M.H. Lindbeck, "Communist Policy and the Chinese Family," Far Eastern Survey, #20, (July 25, 1951), pp. 137-41.

36. Liu Shao-chi, quoted in David S. Nivison, Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, Stanford University, 1954, p. 15. Nivison's study will appear in symposium, Thought and Officialdom in China, Univ. of Chicago Press, early 1956.

183
668

of happiness -- this is the highest expression of Communist morality..."[37]

This is the basic principle: utter subordination of the individual to the Party. But when we examine some of the personal qualities which the Communists want, we find them linked in many ways to Chinese tradition. The good Communist is "able to love others and hate others" (A phrase from the Analects of Confucius); that is, he never injures his comrades for his own benefit but vigorously fights the enemies of the revolution. Towards his comrades his attitude is one of "genuineness and sympathy." (Analects) He does "nothing to others that he would not have done to himself." (Analects) He "grieves before all the rest of the world grieves and is happy only after all the rest of the world is happy." (Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva-savior, adapted by an eleventh century Confucian thinker.) He "has no individual apprehensions or private desires to obscure and pervert his investigation of things and understanding of true principles," (a restatement of the late Confucian view of purity of mind as being necessary for true knowledge.)[38]

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37. Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member" in Compton, op. cit., p. 110. Nivison, op. cit., p. 18, points out that this prescription is close to the classic descriptions of the traditional virtue of chung -- absolute loyalty to superiors.

38. These characterizations are all from authoritative treatise by Liu Shao-ch'i, ibid., translated in Compton, op. cit., pp. 108-55. Traditional sources are identified in Nivison, op.cit., p. 19-20.

•183 668 To attain these and other "good" qualities, the Communist, like his Confucian ancestors, is to pattern his character after approved models and to subject himself to intensive self-cultivation. In traditional China, the models of character and behavior found in the classics and histories were to be studied and followed by individuals who sought to improve themselves, Books on filial piety were required reading. Now the Communists set up Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao as personal models; everyone is capable of attaining the great qualities of these revolutionary geniuses if he tries.[39] Even selected heroes from China's "feudal past" are recommended as models.[40] Such models are presented in fiction, in textbooks, in newspapers, and young and old are urged to emulate these heroes. In addition, "model" workers, farmers, soldiers are feted and publicized, and their pictures and idealized biographies appear in all propaganda media.

Self-cultivation consists of being unremittingly conscious of one's faults and of Communist ideals, of being ever alert, in study and action, to the recrudescence of "bad" attitudes which are the residue of one's pre-Communist education. Liu Shao-ch'i stresses the development of consciousness in the individual; through consciousness one is free from the determining forces of

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39. Liu Shao-ch'i, op.cit., quoted in Nivison, p. 16.

40. Ch'en Sang, "Tang-hsing Yu Ssu Cheng-huo" [ Party Nature and Private Life] in Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen [ On the Party and the Individual] by Ch'en Po-ta and others, Hong Kong reprint, 1948, p. 3, cited in Nivison, op.cit., p. 76, note 16.

183 168 history and environment and becomes capable of working creatively for the aims of the new society. This emphasis on consciousness is connected with both traditional ethics and Soviet psychology. On the one hand, it has "an obvious affinity to the Neo-Confucian notion of cultivation as freeing the individual from the tyranny of blind habit and unconscious selfish motivations."[41] On the other, it reflects the recent development of Soviet psychology; from an earlier denunciation of consciousness as "smacking of bourgeois idealism" the Russians have come to the view that "consciousness is a central process in making man capable of forging his own destinies."[42]

The list of bad qualities denounced by Communists is long; liberalism, formalism, bureaucratism, opportunism, and a dozen others are being continually denounced. How does one rid oneself of these vices? The following formula, here used against the vice of individualism, is typical:

> "The methods transmitted by the ancients for raising oneself out of the vulgar state and entering sagehood, becoming a Buddha or a Taoist spirit, all required one to go through a long period of discipline. If we want to shed the early form of individualism and acquire a spiritual form of collectivism, we must cultivate and discipline ourselves over and over; ...we should continually ask ourselves this question: 'Am I or am I not still guilty of individualism?' If we have a thought, utter a sentence, walk a step or do a thing, we should listen for the response

41. Cf. Nivison, op.cit., p. 15.
42. [ next page]

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668

of others [ the group] : this is -- or is not -- individualism."[43]

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticism in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.[44] This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior.

B. Time, Change, and Causation

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In traditional China, time and change were

42. Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's forword to this volume, xxii.

43. Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen [ On the Party and the Individual], cited in Nivison, op.cit., pp.45-46, and note 66.

44. Cf. Anon., "The 'Struggle Meeting' in Communist China," Far Eastern Notes, No. 1. April 21, 1952.